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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

GARY ROGERS, by his Guardian ad
litem, RALPH A. ROGERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.I
1

•

Case No.

7586

JO ANX WAGSTAFF, PAUL L.
\YAGST.AFF and \Y. E. LEilfMON,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents accept the Statement of Facts as given
by Appellant except that the action was to recover

damages resulting from an accident and in ;p,laintiff's
complaint it is alleged that the defendtant JoAnn Wagstaff drove a motor vehicle .against plaintiff. (R. 2)
STATEilfENT OF POINTS
THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY THE
STATUTE (57-4-12 Utah Code Annotated 1943) IS AFFECTED
BY THE MARRIAGE OF AN APPLICANT UNDER THE
AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS OR A CHANGE IN CUSTODY
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2
OF ANi APPLICANT· BY VJRTUE OF A DE·CREE OF DIVORCE, THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN GRANTING A SUMMARY. J.UUGMENT.

ARGUMENT
THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY THE
STATUTE (57-4-12 Utah Code Annotated 1943) IS AFFECTED
BY THE MARRIAGE OF AN APPLICANT UNDER THE
AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS OR A CHANGE IN CUSTODY
OF AN APPLI·CANT BY VIRTUE OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE, THEREFOR·E, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

It is defendants' contention that upon the marriage
of J o Ann Wagstaff, said J o• Ann Wagstaff became
under the law an adult person fully responsible for her
own acts, and that the provisions of Section 57-4-12,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pertaining to the application
of minors under the .age of 18 yea;rs for driver's licenses
is not applicable. Section 57-4-12, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, provides as follows:
'' (a) The applications of any persons under
the age of eighteen years for an instruction permit
or operator's license shall he signed and verified
before a person authorized to administer oaths by
the father of the applicant, if the father is living
and has custody of the applicant, otherwise by the
mother or guardian having custody of swch minor,.
or in the event that a miwor has no father, mother
or guardian,, then an operator's license shall not
he granted to the mirvor unless the application is
signed by an employer of such minor or by some
other responsible person who is willing to as.sume
the obligation imposed under this act upon a person signing the application of a minor.
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.. (b) .Any ne9ligence or ·willful misoonduct
of a minor under the aqe of ei9llfeen years when
driving a n1otor Yehicle upon a highway shall be
iinputed to the person who has signed the applieation of such minor for a permit or license, which
person ~hall be jointly and severally liable with
such minor for any da1nages caus·e:d by such neglig-enee or willful misconduct (except as otherwise
provided in the next succeeding subse0tion).

" (e) In the event a minor deposits or there
is deposited upon his behalf proof of financial responsibility in respeet to the operation of a motor
vehicle owned by him, or if not the owner of a
motor vehicle, then with respect to the operation
of any motor vehicle, in form and in amounts as
required under the motor vehicle financial respon:;;ibility laws of this state, then the department
may accept the application of such minor when
signed by owe parent or the gwardian of such
minor, and while such proof is maintained such
parent or guardian shall not be subject to the
liability imposed under the preceding subsection
of this section.
'' (d) Any person who has signed the application of a 1?tinor for a license may thereafter file
with the department a verified written request
that the license of said minor so granted be cancelled. Thereupon the department shall cancel the
license of said minor and the person who signed
the application of such minor shall b~ relieved
from the liability imposed under this act by reason
of having signed such application on account of
any subsequent negligence or willful misconduct
of such minor in operating a motor vehiele.
'' (e) The department upon receipt of satisfactory evidence of the death of the person or
persons who signed the application of a minor for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

a license shall cancel such license and shall not
issue a new license until such time as a new application, duly signed and verified, is made as
required by this act. This provision shall not apply in the event the milnor has attained the age of
eighteen ye1ars.
"·(f) All operators' licenses issued to persons who are under the age of eighteew years at
the effective date of this act are hereby cancelled
until they have been duly reapplied for as provided in this section.''
It should be noted that the provisions of this statute
use the wording "minor" and "eighteen years." Before
this section can be made applicable, it is only logical that
both of these terms should be given effect. Appellant's
contention that the word "minor" should be given no
effect at all is entirely without reason. It should be noted
that in the act relating to the licensing of motor vehicle
operators and chauffeurs, Section 57-4-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, provides definitions for some of the
terms used therein. It should be further noted that the
word "minor" is not defined specifically for purpose of
this act. However, under the terms of 57-4-3, subsection
(d) the term ''person'' is defined. Said s·ection provides:
''PERSON. Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.''
It must he assumed that the legislature intended some
meaning to be given to the term "minor," therefore,
it is necessary that we seek the definition of that term
as used in Section 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
to-wit:
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"The period of nlinority extends in males to
the ag·e of twenty-one years and in fen1ales to that
of eig-hteen years; but all minors obtain their
1najori ty by marriage.''
Respondents agree with the statement made by Appellant that the pri1nary rule of construction of statutes
i~ to ascertain and declare the intention of legislature
and to carry such intention into effect in the fullest
degree. (See Appellant's brief, pages 5 and 6). By thus
giYing effect to each portion of the statute, particularly
the wording "minor" and "eighteen years," it is evident
that a married woman, even though under eighteen years
of age, would not be subject to the provisions of Section
57--l-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the statute which
imputes the negligence o:f a minor to the person who
signed the application for his driver's license. Appellant
states on page 7 of its brief:
"If the word is to be defined as defendant
contended, in section (c) the word "minor" could
mean a male person of nineteen years, which is
obviously not the intention of the statute.''
Appellant has again forgotten that the wording of the
statute should be followed wherever it is clear and the
statute specifically states,
minor under the age of
eighteen yea,rs." Therefore, a male person nineteen
years of age would obviously not come within the terms
of the statute.
((.a

This precise question, as far as counsel can determine, has never been decided in any other jurisdiction.
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However, the statutes and cases which bear on questions
relating to this point, give us a full insight into the intention of the legislature. The legislature, if it intended
that every person (as defined in the act) under the age
of eighteen years should be required to have their application signed by a responsible person, as set forth in the
act, would have used the word ''person'' rather than
interposing the term "minor" throughout the statute.
The word u person" is adeqwately defined in the driver's
license act .and has been used~ itn other portions of the act.
Appellant on page 10 of its brief states as follows:
"If Section 1, Chapter 1, Title 14, is read into
the statute, the ludicrous situation of a married
female having a right to drive, regardless of
whether she had attained the age of sixteen years,
occurs.''
The only ludicrousness mentioned herein is Appellant's
statement, for it is apparent that he has failed to read
the drive-r's license act. Section 57-4-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Subsection (a) provides:
"An operator's license shall not be granted to
any person under the age of sixteen years and a
chauffeur's license shall not be granted to any
person under the age of eighteen years.''
It is obvious from the reading of this statute and
the definition set up by the legislation of the term person
that sixteen years of age is the minimum requirement for
an operator's license and ·eighteen years the minimum requirement for a chauffeur's license. The legislature when
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it intended to include everyone or exclude everyone from
the tern1s of the dri\'er's license aet has used the word
"person." This is apparent in Se·ction 57-4-8, Subse-ction
(b) which reatls as follo\vs:
":No person \vho is under the age of twenty:'-even years shall drive any school bus * * *.''
The word ''minor'' must be given some meaning
for the simple reason that it clearly indicates a different
connotation than the word ''person.'' The position of
respondents is supported by authorities in other states.
The Oregon legislature in 1939, aware of the: very question which is now before this court, amended their law
to substitute the word "person'' for the word "minor."
(Laws of 1939 c 354, par. 4). Paragraph 115-209, Volume
8, Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated, 1939, now reads
as follo·ws :
''The Secretary of State shall not grant the
application of any person under the age of eighteen years for an instruction permit, operator's
license, or a special permit to operate motor vehicles unless such application is signed by the
father of the applicant, if the father is living and
has custody of the applicant, otherwise, by the
mother or guardian having the custody of such
person, or, in the event a person under the age of
eighteen years has no father, mother, or guardian,
then an operator's license shall not be granted to
such person, unless his application therefore is
signed b:v his en1ployer."
The Oregon legislature made this change cognizant
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of Paragraph 63-502, Volume 5, Oregon Compiled Laws
Annotated, 1939, which gives substantially the same
definition of minority as Section 14-1-1 Utah Code Annotated, 19·43. Said section provides :
''All female persons shall be deemed to have
arrived at the age of majority upon their being
married according to law***''
Appellant cites the case of Easterly v. Cook, 140 Cal.
App. 115, 35 P. 2d 164, to sustain its position. In this
case the court held that the fact that a female person
under the age of eighte:en had married did not relieve
the person who had signed her operator's license from
responsi'bility for the negligent or willful misconduct
of said female person. However, to arrive at an understan:ding of the court's decision, it is necessary that the
California law be recognized. Section 25 of the California
Civil Code at the time this case was decided read as
follows:
''Minors are all persons under twenty-one
years of age ; provided, that this section shall be
subject to the provisions of the titles of this code
on marriage and shall not be construed as repealing or limiting the provisions of section 204 of this
code; provided, further that any female who has
oontracted a lawful marriage wnd is of the age of
eighteen or over, shall be deemed to be of the age
of majority and to be an adult person for the
purpos·e of e·ntering into any engagement or transaction respecting property or her estate, or for
the purpose of entering into any contract, the
same as if she was twenty-one ~-ears of age."
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Furthermore, the California Motor Vehicle Code
takes into consideration the question which is now before
this court. California :Motor Vehicle Code, Section 350,
reads as follows :
''(a) (Persons deemed minors: Signing and
verification of application by parents, par·ent,
guardian or custodian). For the purposes of this
section, all persons wnder twenty-one ye(J)rs of
age, exce,pt eighteen years of age or over who
have been married, shall be deemed to be minors.
No application for an operator's or chauffeur's
license shall be gran ted by the department to
any minor unless such application is signed and
verified by the father and mother of such minor,
if both father and mother are living and have
custody of the minor; provided, however, that
"1. If neither parent is living or has custody
the application shall be signed and verified by
the guardian ; or if there is no guardian, by a
person having custody of the minor.
'' 2. If only one parent is living or has ·custody, the application shall be signed and verified by
such parent.
'' (b) (Married minor under 18) If a minor
under the age of 18 ye.ars is married, the application may be sign·ed and verified by the adult
spouse of such minor or by the parents of either
spouse or in lieu of such signature, such minor
may file proof of ability to respond in damages
as provided in section 414 of the Vehicle Code.
•' (c) (Where required signers are nonresidents or the minor is emancipated) If the person
or persons required to sign and verify the application of a minor, are not residents of this State,
or if such minor is emancipated other than by
marriage, the department may accept an appliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cation signed and verified by the minor and accompanied by proof of ability to respond in
damages, as provided in section 414 of the Y ehicle
Code.
" (d) (Suspension of license on failure of
proof of ability to r·espond in damages) If, at any
time during the minority of the person who has
given proof of ability to respond in damages, such
proof shall fail, then the depart·ment shall forthwith suspend such license until proof of such
licensee's continued ability to respond in future
damages has been given or until such minor has
otherwise complied with the requirements of
this code relative to the issuance of an operator's
or chauffeur's lieense.
'' (e) (Signing and verification only by
minor, accompanied by proof of ability to respond
in damages) If the person or persons who are
hereinbefore required by the provisions of this
code to sign and verify the application of such
minor give their written consent, the department
may accept an application signed and verified only
by the minor and accompanied by proof of ability
to respond in dmnages, as provided in section
414 of the Vehicle Code. Such person or persons
giving the consent to but not signing or verifying
said application, as provided in this section, shall
not be subject merel~' by reason of having given
such consent to the civil liability specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 352 hereof."
Hence, in California a married person under the age
of eighteen years is still a minor. It is for this reason
that the court in the Easterly case refers to the defendant
woman as a minor, even though she had been married.
By such reasoning the imputation of negligence of a
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minor under the age of eighteen years would include
every '·person" under the age of eighteen years. If the
Utah legislature had intended that such a position be
incorporated into the Utah law, it would have been very
simple for then1 to have said so. However, their express
language definitely indicates their intention to exclude
such a proposition.
Even though this particular question has never been
decided in other jurisdictions, there are cases which have
dealt with this section regarding the imputation of
negligence. In the case of Houston v. Holmes, a Mississippi case, 202 :Jiiss. 300, 303, 32 So. 2d 138, 139, the court
held that a father who had signed the original license
for his son but not a renewal license, that the negligence
of the son thereafter could not be imputed to the father.
The court states at page 139 (So. 2d) as follows:
''Statutes in derogation of the common law,
are, as a general rule, strictly construed. City of
Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 259, 196 So. 223.
Under which rule, legislation creating a liability
where no liability existed at common law should
be construed most favorably to the person· or entity subj·ected to the liability, and against the
claimant for damages. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec.
402, P. 426. Such a statutory liability is not to he
extended 'beyond that which is clearly indicated
by express terms or by necessary implication from
the language used;' statutes creating liabilities
which did not exjst at common law although supposed to be founded on consideration of public
policy and general convenience are not to be extended beyond the plain intent of the words of
the statute.''
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In the case of Hill v. Harris, 87 N.E. 2d 97, 101, in
the court of Common Pleas, the court stated:
"It must be conceded that in the absence of
legislation to the contrary Samuel L. Harris, as
the father of R:obert Harris, and in the abs·ence of
agency, would not be liable for a tort committed
by his son. Since the legislature has spoken on
the subject the language of the statute enacted
by it changing the common law rule must be
strictly construed * * * ''

In the case of Weber v. Punyarn, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 70
P. 2d 183, 185, the California court stated:

'' * * * Since the imputed negligence statute
created a new right of action, giving a remedy
against a party who would not otherwise be liable,
it must be strictly construed. Such was the holding in Cook v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County 12 Cal. App. 2d 608, 611; 55 P. 2d 1227 1
1228, when the court cited 59 Corpus Juris, P.
1129, reading: 'A statute cr·eating a new liability,
or even a remedial statute giving a remedy
against a party who would not otherwise be liable,
must be strictly construed in favor of the persons
sought to be subject to their operation.' * * *"
Also see in accord Hanmabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519;
180 S.E. 416.
The Appellant states at page 13 of its brief:
"The statute dearly provides for the method
of one seeking to be relieved of such responsibility
and he may not adopt another means at his own
convenience.''
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The Appellant contend8 that the filing of a verified written request with the driver's license department of the
State Tax Com.Inission is the only means whereby he can
be relieved of the responsibility for signing the original
application of a minor. Of course, this is not so because
the statute explicitly provides that such responsibility
ceases upon the department receiving satisfactory evidence of the death of the person who signed the application (57 --1-12 (e) U CA, 1943) ; these provisions do not
apply in the event the minor has attained the age of
eighteen years (57 -4-12 (c) U CA, 1943) ; furthermore,
it has been held in California under a statute similar in
purpose to the Utah statute, that the liability of the
person who signs it terminated with the expiration of the
license. Therefore, if in addition a temporary license or
an instruction permit had been signed by the parent, upon
the expiration of such a license the liability of the original
signer would cease. The California court in the case of
Sommers 'C. Van Der Linden, 24 Cal. App. 2d 375, 378,
379; 73 P. 2d 83, 85, 86, states:
''The contention that the legallia:bility of the
parents for the minor's negligence continued beyond the date on which the license expired is not
persuasive . . . Since the primary purpose of the
application required to be made by the provisions
of subdivision (a) of Section 62 of the act was
for the issuance of a license which the statute
ordained should automatically expire two years
after the date of issuance, we are impelled to the
conclusion that the vicarious liability imposed by
subdivision. (b) of the aforesaid section ended
when the lic2nse expired."
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Appellant states at page 11 of its brief:
If the word' mirvor' is consttrUed to exclude
a ma,rried woman under the age of eighteen years,
the interpretation l0ads to unnecess1ary technicalities."
u

Appellant has failed to state the nature of these unnecessary technicalities and respondents have been unable to determine what the appellant may have had in
mind. It appears to respondents that it is fairly simple
procedure to determine whether an individual is under
eighteen years of age and, furthermore, to determine
whether said individual is a minor. Therefore, if an
individual is under eighteen years of age and furthermore
a minor, then Section 57-4-12 is applicable. Respondents
are heartily in agreement with the Utah case of Taft v.
Glade, et al, ______ Utah ______ , 201 P. 2d 285, 287, which Appellant cites at page 7 of its brief, to-wit:

'' * * * If reasonably possible effect should
be given to every part of a statute and if the enactment is subject to one or more interpretations by
reason of conflicting provisions, then that construction which will harmonize and give effect to
all provisions is preferred.''
It is unreasonable to require that a married adult
woman secure the signature of a parent even in the event
said adult married wmnan deposits proof of financial responsibility with the Tax Commission. This would be the
result if Appellant's theory were followed in applying
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Section 37 --±-12 (c) DCA, 1943, which reads in part as
follows:
'·In the event a minor deposits ... proof of
financial responsibility ... then the department
may accept the application of such mino.r when
signed by one parent or the guardian of such
n1inor, * * • ''
A married woman in this status is not under the custody
or cont,-,ol of her parents and it would be unreasonable
to conclude that she is under the custod.y mnd control of
her huband.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion respondents assert that appellant's
hypothesis, which he would ha~e the court legislate into
the statute, is unreasonable and fails to give ,effect to the
full statute. The statute (57-4-12 DCA 1943) expresses
the intention of the legislature in plain and simple
language, easily understood and there is no reason to
complicate it. JoAnn Wagstaff was an adult married
woman at the date of the accident and not a minor, therefore, the provisions of 57-4-12 UCA 1943, a~e not applicable. Judgment for respondents should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE &
McCULLOUGH,
Attorneys for Defendarnts and
Respondents.

By Leland S. MeCullough of counsel
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